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Fisher and Bell: Marine Mammal Protection Act

NOTE

DID UNITED STATES V. HAYASHI FAIL TO
PROVIDE A SAFE HARBOR FOR MARINE
MAMMALS UNDER THE MARINE MAMMAL
PROTECTION ACT?

1.

INTRODUCTION

Dolphins, porpoises, whales, and other marine mammals
have been exploited and their existence threatened due in
large part to the practices of the fishing industry. 1 The boldest
step that the American government has taken thus far to protect marine mammals is its enactment of the Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972 (hereinafter "MMPA,,).2 Even with the
enactment of the MMPA, marine mammals remain unprotected due to lack of enforcement and judicial interpretations that
limit the scope of the MMPA.
This note focuses on one such instance where a court erred
in interpreting a key term in the MMPA. In United States v.
Hayashi,3 the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, found that a fish1. When Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act dolphins and
porpoises were endangered, as 250,000 porpoises were being slaughtered by the
tUna industry each year. Laura L. Jones, Note, The Marine Mammal Protection
Act and International Protection of Cetaceans, 22 VAND. J. 'rRANSNAT'L L. 997, 99899 (1989). In 1989, 300 dolphins each day were being killed by tuna fishers. Id. at
999.
2. David M. Levin, Towards Effective Cetacean Protection, 12 NAT. RESOURCES L., 549, 571 (1979).
The MMPA is codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1994).
3. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (rehearing en
bane) (per Reinhardt, J., with whom Norris, J., joined; Browning, J., dissenting).
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erman who shot at porpoises to deter them from his catch did
not commit a "taking" under the MMPA. 4 The court held that
to constitute a criminal "taking" under the MMPA, harassment
of a marine mammal must entail direct and serious disruptions
of normal mammal behavior. 5 This decision may result in further exploitation and suffering of marine mammals.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT
The impact humans have upon marine mammals has
"ranged from what might be termed malign neglect to virtual
genocide."s Marine mammals have been "shot, blown up,
clubbed to death, run down by boats, poisoned, and exposed to
a multitude of other indignities, all in the interests of profit or
recreation, with little or no consideration of the potential impact of these activities on the animal populations involved."7
One of humankind's most harmful impacts upon marine mammals results as a consequence of tuna fishing with purse
seines. s
In response to these practices, Congress enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act for the purpose of maintaining
marine mammals at healthy population levels. 9 The MMPA
establishes that marine mammals, and the marine ecosystem

4. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
5. ld. at 864.
6. H.R. REp. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144.
7. ld. at 4144-45.
8. Levin, supra note 2, at 551. Purse seine fishing is a procedure in
which fishermen use dolphin to catch tuna. Because tuna associate with
certain species of dolphin, fishermen look for dolphins to locate the tuna. Once spotted, fishermen herd dolphin and the tuna swimming beneath
them into mile-long nets then close the nets around them. Once in the
net, most dolphin panic and dive to the bottom where they get caught in
the net webbing and drown. Elise Miller, Comment, The Fox Guarding the
Henhouse: Conflicting Duties under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 31 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1065-66 (1990-91). When the MMPA was enacted, it was
estimated that between 200 to 400 thousand porpoises are caught and
killed in tuna nets each year. H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4148.
9. H.R. REP. NO. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6155.
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upon which they depend for survival, require protection from
human activities. 10 The MMPA covers all mammals who
spend part of their lives in the sea. 11 The largest category of
animals protected by this act is the Cetaceans, which includes
whales, dolphins, and porpoises. 12
In passing the MMPA, Congress recognized that "man's
thumb is already on the balance of Nature," and decent treatment for the marine mammals may well be in the long-term
best interests of man. 13 To achieve this goal, the MMPA prohibits the "taking" of any marine mammal by any person or
vessel or other conveyance subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. 14 Under the MMPA, the term "take" is defined
as "to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt,
capture, or kill any marine mammal. "15 The goal of the
MMPA is to reduce such takings to insignificant levels and to
greatly reduce the mortality and serious injury rate. 16

10. H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4145. Congress found that "certain species and population
stocks of marine mammal are, or may be, in danger of extinction or depletion as a result of man's activities." 16 U.S.C. § 1361(1) (1994).
11. [d. at 4148.
12. Levin, supra note 2, at 553. Dolphin and porpoises are so similar
physiologically, behaviorally and morphologically that the names are used
interchangeably. [d. at 555. The names will therefore be used interchangeably throughout this note.
13. H.R. REp. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4145.
14. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1) (1994). The MMPA also prohibits any person
from possessing any marine mammal or marine mammal product, from transporting, purchasing, selling, exporting, or from offering to purchase, selJ,
or export any marine mammal or marine mammal product taken in violation
of the Act. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(3) & (4) (1994).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1994). The 1981 Amendment to the MMPA provides that in the case of purse seine fishing for yellowfin tuna the goal
of approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate will be satisfied
by "a continuation of the application of the best marine mammal safety
techniques and equipment that are economically and technologically practicable." [d.
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III. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 24, 1991, David Hayashi, a part-time commercial fisherman 17 and life-time resident of Hawaii, was fishing
for Ahi l8 off the coast of Waianae. 19 As he fished, a group of
four porpoises began eating Ahi off his fishing lines. 20
Hayashi fired two rifle shots to the immediate rear of the animals in an attempt to deter the porpoises from his catch. 21
Neither of these shots struck the porpoises. 22
A state enforcement officer witnessed the shots fired by
Hayashi and reported the incident to the National Marine
Fisheries Service (hereinafter "NMFS,,).23 In February 1991,
NMFS agents interviewed Hayashi and his son (who had been
present on the boat when Hayashi fired at the porpoises) regarding the incidene4 and obtained their written statements. 25 A criminal information was subsequently filed,
charging Hayashi with "knowingly taking a marine mammal"
in violation of the MMPA. 26

17. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859, 861. The record does not
specify whether Hayashi was engaged in commercial or recreational fishing at the time of this incident. [d. at 859-67.
18. [d. "Abi" means tuna in the Hawaiian language. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 44 (1976).
19. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. Waianae is off the coast of the Hawaiian
island of Oahu. THE NEW YORK TIMES ATLAS OF THE WORLD 135 (3d ed. 1993).
20. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. The porpoises were approximately twentyfive yards from the boat. Appellee's Answer 1,3rief at 2, U.S. v. Hayashi, 22
F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 91-10044).
21. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
22. [d.
23. [d. Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Department of
Commerce is responsible for whales, dolphins, porpoises, sea lions and
seals. Within the Department of Commerce, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (hereinafter "NOAA") is responsible for the management and protection of marine mammals. NOAA's subordinate agency,
the National Marine Fisheries Service, is assigned the responsibilities of
research and management of whales, porpoises, dolphin and seals. H.R. REP.
NO. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4146.
24. Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859
(9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-10044).
25. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
26. [d. Hayashi was charged under § 1371(a)(2)(A) of the MMPA. [d. This
section of the statute provides that "it is unlawful. . . for any person or
vessel or other conveyance to take any marine mammal in waters or on
lands under the jurisdiction of the United States." 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(A)
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In July 1991, the state proceeded against Hayashi before a
magistrate judge. 27 Hayashi unsuccessfully sought dismissal
of the charges on a theory that the MMPA, as applied, was unconstitutionally vague. 28 A trial ensued, based on the stipulated facts received into the record. 29 The magistrate judge
convicted Hayashi of intentionally taking marine mammals, as
prohibited by the MMPA, and sentenced him to one year of
unsupervised probation, together with a $500 fine. 30
Hayashi appealed to the United States District Court for
the District of Hawaii, renewing the unconstitutional vagueness argument asserted in his motion to dismiss and raising a
claim of insufficient evidence. 31 The district court affirmed his
conviction. 32 Hayashi then brought an appeal before the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, asserting the same grounds presented before the district court. 33The Ninth Circuit reversed the
conviction, holding that there was insufficient evidence to find
a criminal "taking" by "harassment" under the MMPA. 34 The
court did not reach the issue of unconstitutional vagueness. 35
(1994).
27. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
28. [d. Specifically, Hayashi argued that the term "harass," as specified
in the MMPA and as applied to porpoises, was unconstitutionally vague,
thereby rendering the statute void. Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, United
States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92·10044).
29. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. The facts submitted to the magistrate judge
included the Hayashis' written statements and an NMFS agent's report and
notes on the interviews of the father and son. [d.
30. Appellant's Opening Brief at I, United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859
(9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92·10044). A person who violates the Marine Mammal
Protection Act may be assessed a civil or criminal penalty. 16 U.S.C. § 1375
(1994). If a person violates any provision of the Act, or permit or regulation issued thereunder, the Secretary may assess a civil penalty of up to
$10,000 for each violation. 16 U.S.C. § 1375(a)(1) (1994). Further, the Secretary may assess a criminal penalty to a person who knowingly violates the
MMPA. 16 U.S.C. § 1375(b) (1994). Upon conviction, the criminal violator of
the Act may be fined up to $20,000 for each violation, or imprisoned for
up to one year, or both. [d. Each unlawful taking is a considered a separate offense. 16 U.S.C. § 1375(a)(1) (1994).
31. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
32. [d. The district court did not hear oral argument. [d.
33. [d.
34. [d. at 865.
35. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861 n.1. Although the Ninth Circuit did not
reach Hayashi's vagueness challenge, it noted that the term "harass," as
set forth in the MMPA, raises an issue of adequate notice to potential
violators. [d. at 865 n.14.
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N. COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. MAJORITY OPINION
In United States v. Hayashi,36 the Ninth Circuit was
asked to determine whether the defendant's act of intentionally
shooting in the vicinity of porpoises in an attempt to deter
them from eating Ahi off of his fishing line fell within the
MMPA's proscription against the "taking" of marine mammals. 37 The Ninth Circuit, in its majority opinion, held that
the district court, which had affirmed a magistrate judge's
conviction of the defendant, committed two errors. 3S First, the
actus reus, or criminal act itself, was improperly defined because the court had relied upon an improper statute to formulate its definition of "take" under the act. 39 Second, the mens
rea, or the mental element for the crime charged, was not
properly limited to conduct which was knowing and intentional. 40 Mter setting forth and explaining the errors below, the
court went on to determine that there was insufficient evidence
to convict Hayashi of "knowingly taking" a marine mammal in
violation of the MMPA. 41 Thus, the Ninth Circuit reversed
Hayashi's conviction. 42
.

36. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994).
37. Id. at 861.
38. Id. at 862.
39. Id.
40. Id. The district court had affirmed Hayashi's conviction under the
erroneous belief that negligent conduct was sufficient to support criminal prosecution of Hayashi under the MMPA. While the MMPA authorizes
both civil and criminal penalties for violation of its provisions, criminal
penalties only apply to persons who "knowingly" violate a provision of the
act. In the proceedings below, the parties referred the court to 50 C.F.R.
§ 17.3, which includes both negligent and intentional acts in its definition
of "harass." In so doing, they failed to inform the court that the MMPA
requires the defendant to "knowingly" commit the prohibited conduct before criminal liability may attach. The district court's affirmance of
Hayashi's conviction rested at least in part upon its misunderstanding of
the requisite mens rea. While the district court found that "[f]iring the
rifle in waters containing porpoises was a negligent act that created a
likelihood of ir\iury to the porpoises" they went on to suggest that there
was also evidence of Hayashi's intentional attempt to deter the porpoises
from his catch. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 862.
41. Id. at 865.
42. Id. at 861.
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Statutory Interpretation: Defining the Actus Reus

To correctly define the actus reus the Ninth Circuit looked
first to the statute under which Hayashi had been charged, 16
U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(A).43 This statute prohibits the "taking" of
a marine mammal in United States waters.44 Noting that the
MMPA defines "take" as "to harass, hunt, capture, or kill or
attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill,,,45 the court determined that only the terms "harass" and "attempt to harass"
were potentially applicable to Hayashi's conduct. 46 At the time
Hayashi committed the act of firing at the porpoises, the term
"harass" was not further defined within the MMPA or its companion administrative regulations. 47 Nevertheless, regulations
issued under the Endangered Species Act defining "take" with
regard to porpoises were available and utilized by the Ninth
Circuit. 46 These regulations state that the intentional or negligent "disturbing" or "molesting" of a marine mammal constitutes a "take.,,49 However, the Ninth Circuit Court found
these examples of "taking" to be equally vague, and determined
that a clearer definition of "taking" by "harassment" was to be
ascertained by referring to the context of the statute. 50
43. [d. at 861.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(A) (1994). See supra note
45. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994).
46. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. The government
terms within the definition of "take" had possible
act of firing shots within the vicinity of porpoises
fish and bait from his fishing lines. [d.

26.
conceded that no other
application to Hayashi's
while they were eating

47. [d.

48. [d. at 863-64 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1994». 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 defines
"take" as to
harass, hunt, capture, collect, kill, or attempt to
harass, hunt, capture, collect or kill any marine
mammal. This includes, without limitation, any of
the following: The collection of dead animals, or
parts thereof; the restraint or detention of a marine mammal, no matter how temporary; tagging a
marine mammal; the negligent or intentional operation of an aircraft or vessel, or the doing of any
other negligent or intentional act which results in
disturbing or molesting a marine mammal; and feeding or attempting to feed a marine mammal in the
wild.
50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1996).
49. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864.
50. [d.
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The term "harass," the court noted, is grouped with "hunt,"
"capture," and "kill" as forms of prohibited "taking."Sl Relying
on the principle that words which are grouped together in a
list should be given similar meaning,S2 the court determined
that each of these terms "involve[d] direct and significant intrusions upon the normal, life-sustaining activities of a marine
mammal."S3 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that similar to those terms, "harass" must involve a similar level of
intrusion.s4
As additional support for this conclusion, the court next
looked to the very regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3, which it determined the magistrate judge and district court had improperly
relied upon in formulating their definition of "take."s5 The
court postulated that although § 17.3 implements the Endangered Species Act, a statute distinct and separate from the
MMPA, the regulations could nevertheless prove to be useful
as analogous authority to aid in interpreting the terms from
the MMPA. 56

Section 17.3 defines "harassment" which constitutes a
"taking" to require a significant disruption of "normal behavioral patterns" including breeding, feeding or sheltering. s7 The

51. [d. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994).
52. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, a familiar principle of statutory
construction, states that if a meaning of a statute is unclear, the meaning of doubtful words may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words and phrases. NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.16, at 183 (5th ed. 1992).
53. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864.
54. [d.
55. [d.
56. [d. The court noted, "section 17.3, issued under the Endangered
Species Act, is not the controlling regulatory definition and is an improper starting point for any MMPA prosecution; it is nonetheless analogous
authority that is of considerable assistance in interpreting 50 C.F.R. §
216.3." [d. Furthermore, the NMFS has itself referred to § 17.3 in interpreting the meaning of "harass" under the MMPA. [d. at 864 n.13.
57. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864. The text of 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 defining harm
states
Harm in the definition of "take" . .. means an act
which actually kills or injuries wildlife. Such act
may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife
by significantly impairing essential behavioral pat-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss1/7

8

Fisher and Bell: Marine Mammal Protection Act

1997]

MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT

75

court noted that this definition emphasized protecting "natural" animal behavior, not abnormal marine mammal activity.58 This definition, the court held, was consistent with the
essence of the MMPA which strove to preserve marine mammals as essential components of the "natural" marine ecosys.tern. 59 The court found that § 17.3 did not support an interpretation of "harassment" which prohibits disturbing marine
mammals who are endangering human life or property.60
Thus the interpretation of "harass" propounded by the court
would look at the act of the alleged harasser and also consider
the act in which the marine mammal was engaged. 61 A "taking" by "harassment," according to the majority of the Ninth
Circuit, encompassed "only direct and serious disruptions of
normal mammal behavior."62
2. Application of the Court's Definition of the Actus Reus to
the Conduct Underlying Hayashi's Conviction

The Ninth Circuit's definition of the actus reus limited
criminal conduct to "direct and serious disruptions of normal
mammal behavior."63 In reviewing the conduct of Hayashi, the
court bifurcated its analysis, looking first at whether the mammals at issue had been disrupted from "normal" behavior, and
subsequently at the reasonableness of Hayashi's conduct. 54

terns, including breeding, feeding or 8heltering.
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1996).
58. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864.
59. [d.
60. [d. at 865.
61. [d.
62. [d.

at 865. The court suggested that the lower courts had given
the term "harass" too broad a definition, and "in the absence of [their]
appropriately restrictive construction of the MMPA and its regulations,
'harass' would raise a serious issue of adequate notice to potential violators." [d. at 865 n.14.
63. [d. at 865.
64. 1d.
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a. The Requirement that "Normal" Behavior Patterns Be
Disrupted
At the moment Hayashi fired shots at the porpoises, the
animals were eating bait and hooked fish from his fishing
lines. 55 Eating fish and bait off a fisherman's lines, the majority asserted, was "not a part of the porpoise's normal eating
habits."56 Furthermore, no evidence was presented establishing that the animals had in fact been deterred from the lines
or even reacted to Hayashi's shots. 67 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the evidence failed to establish that Hayashi's
shots had deterred the porpoises from "normal" behavior patterns. 58

b.

The Requirement of a "Direct and Serious" Disruption

With regard to the requirement that the defendant's conduct result in a direct and serious disruption, the court summarily stated that "Hayashi's conduct was not the kind of
direct, serious disruption of a porpoise's customary pursuits
required to find a criminal 'taking.' Reasonable acts to deter
porpoises from eating fish or bait off a fisherman's line are not
~riminal under the MMPA. ,,59
Thus, having found that there was no "direct and serious
disruption of normal mammal behavior," the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the MMPA and the regulations implementing
the Act failed to reach Hayashi's conduct. 70

65. [d.
66. [d.

67. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 865. The majority noted, however, that any diversion from eating off Hayashi's lines was not required to constitute a
"taking" under the MMPA. [d.
68. [d.
69. [d.

The court emphasized in a footnote that the reasonableness of
deterrent steps depends upon their impact on the mammal. [d. at 865 n.15.
70. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 865.
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3. Squaring the Court's Interpretation with Subsequent Regulations Proscribing the Feeding of Marine Mammals
Subsequent to the incident for which Hayashi was prosecuted, the NMFS promulgated regulations adding "feeding or
attempting to feed" to the definition of "harass" found in 50
C.F.R. § 216.3.71 This amendment to the definition of "harass"
addressed concerns that people feeding marine mammals disrupts their natural feeding patterns, potentially conditioning
them to approach watercraft, and thereby increasing the likelihood "that they will become entangled in fishing gear, be
struck by vessels, or be shot, poisoned, or fed foreign objects."72 The court determined that this amendment deterred
precisely that behavior which Hayashi had himself deterred by
firing the rifle shots. 73 The court concluded that were it to
hold that Hayashi's behavior constituted ''harassment,'' then
under the new regulations, a fisherman would be guilty of
"harassment" by "feeding" if he did not deter a marine mammal from feeding off of his fishing lines. 74 But at the same
time, a fisherman would be guilty of "harassment" by "disturbing" if he took steps to deter such acts. 75 For these reasons,
the court concluded, the new regulation supported their definition of ''harass'' as well as their interpretation that the MMPA
did not reach Hayashi's conduct. 76
B. DISSENT

Judge Browning dissented from the analysis and conclusions of the majority, finding that they represented both bad

71. Id. (referring to 56 Fed. Reg. 11693 (1991) which became effective
April 19, 1991).
72. Id. at 866 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 11693, 11695 (1991».
73. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 866.
74.Id.
75. Id. However, the dissent argues that the majority presented a false
"fisherman's dilemma." Judge Browning asserts 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 only regulates "intentional" feeding of marine mammals, and exempts unintentional,
incidental feeding. Since the fisherman would be fishing for tuna for
human consumption, not to feed to the porpoises, Browning argues that
this provision would not apply to the conduct because the feeding of the
porpoises would be unintentional. Id. at 869 n.6.
76. Id. at 866.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 7

78

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:67

law and bad policy.77 He stated that the goal of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act is the "optimal protection" of marine
mammals from human activities which threaten their surviva1. 78 Thus, he would not limit the scope of the MMPA to human activity which results in the certain physical destruction
or injury of marine mammals. 79 Rather, Judge Browning
found the MMPA expressed a sweeping statement of public
policy and was intended by Congress to regulate a wide variety
of human activity, including those activities which create the
"mere potential" for harm. 8o In Browning's view, "taking" under the MMPA encompassed Hayashi's act of intentionally
firing rifle shots into the water near porpoises which were
feeding from bait and tuna hooked on fishing lines. 81 Browning would affirm Hayashi's conviction. 82
1. A Broad Definition of "Take" is Necessary to Effect Con. gressional Intent

Judge Browning argued that Congress intended "taking" to
be broadly defined. 83 He claimed that as a key jurisdictional
term within the act, its "cramped" construction would "restrict
most aspects of the scheme envisioned by Congress for the
protection of marine mammals.,,84
Browning pointed out that the MMPA's substantive provisions commence with an absolute moratorium on the "taking"
of marine mammals. 8s The Secretary is delegated the authority to regulate both public and private conduct falling within

77. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 871.
78. [d. at 867 (citing to 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4148).
79. [d.
80. [d. The adopted legislation was constructed with conservation in
mind. The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries indicated that the
"legislation should be adopted to require that we act conservatively.. ..
[N]o steps should be taken regarding [endangered marine mammals] that
might prove to be adverse or even irreversible in their effects until more
is known." H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4148.
81. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 867.
82. [d. at 866.
83. [d. at 867.
84. [d.
85. [d. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1984).
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this moratorium; his power is confined by the meaning assigned to the term. 86
When "take" is read restrictively, as it is under the
majority's formulation, the scope of activities encompassed
within the Act's prohibitions is limited, as is the Secretary's
power to protect endangered marine mammals. 87 Judge
Browning asserted that such a construction would be inconsistent with Congress's stated intent to provide "optimal" marine
mammal protection. 88 On the other hand, Browning countered, a broad definition of "take" allows the necessary flexibility for effective administration and is consistent with
protections envisioned by Congress. 89
2. The Statutory Language, Legislative History, and
Secretary's Determinations Support the Broad Interpretation
of "Taking" by "Harassment" under which Hayashi's Conduct
Is Proscribed
Judge Browning next looked to the MMPA, its companion
regulations, and the Secretary's interpretation of the term
"taking.,,90 He concluded that these sources supported an interpretation of "take" sufficiently broad to encompass
Hayashi's conduct. 91
Noting, as had the majority, that "take" is defined by the
terms "harass"
, "hunt"
, "capture"
, and "kill"
, Browning deter86. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 866-67. The Secretary may prohibit conduct
which is harmful to the marine mammals as well as develop and encourage
means of ensuring their survival. The areas that will be affected by the
majority's
narrow
construction
of the
term
"taking"
include
the
Secretary's research into methods of fishing that minimize the incidental
"taking" of marine mammals (16 U.S.C. §§ 1380-1381), the reported incidental
"takings" by vessels that have received exemptions to provide information
on the effect of fishing techniques on marine mammals (16 U.S.C. §
1383a(c),(g», and the Marine Mammal Commission's continuing review of
humane means of "taking" marine mammals (16 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(2». [d. "Secretary" refers to the Secretary of Interior and the Secretary of Commerce.
[d. at 866 n.1.
87. [d.
88. [d. at 867.
89. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 867.
90. [d. at 867-69.
91. [d. at 867.
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mined that Congress had intended to regulate human contact
with marine mammals, "progressing in severity" from mere
"harassment" to the ultimate destruction, the "killing" of the
mammal. 92 "Harass," he found, was not intended to be submerged into a singular meaning encompassing the whole of the
statutory phrase. 93 It must, he concluded, be read to broaden
the definition of "taking" and the scope of the Act itself.94
In support of this conclusion, Judge Browning noted that
Congress had previously identified the "intentional pursuit of
marine mammals" and the use of "acoustic deterrent devices"
as "takings" by "harassment" proscribed by the Act. 95 Furthermore, turning to 50 C.F.R. § 216.3, Judge Browning cited regulatory examples of "taking," including the mere restraint or
tagging of a marine mammal. He found these to be inconsistent with the majority's assertion that "harassment" contemplates only "direct and significant intrusions" upon "normal"
mammal behavior. 96
Finally, Judge Browning reviewed exemptions and exceptions to the Act's broad proscriptions. 97 He concluded that the
parties involved in enactment and administration of the Act, as
well as the parties governed by the Act, viewed "taking" as a
broad concept, one broad enough, he asserted, to encompass

92. [d.
93. [d.

94. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868. Judge Browning's conclusion that "harass"
must significantly add to the definition of take is premised at least in
part upon the fact that Congress had rejected a proposal to define "take"
in terms which differed only in the absence of "harass" and inclusion of
"wound." [d.
95. [d.
96. [d. at 869. Judge Browning was concerned not only with the
majority's narrowing of the definition of "taking" here, but also with the
"elusive concept" of "normal marine mammal behavior," which is not mentioned in the Act or its legislative history and will require courts and
regulators to develop a system of rules from which to determine exactly
what behavior the majority is referring to. In addition, Judge Browning
challenged the majority's suggestion that a porpoise's feeding off of fishing lines constituted "unnatural" or "abnormal" behavior. He argued that
by excluding such behavior from the protections of the MMPA the majority denied marine mammals protection from harm arising out of human fishing activity, a primary purpose of the Act. [d. at 868-69.
97. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868.
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the conduct of Hayashi and support his criminal conviction. 98
Noting that the Secretary's authority includes discretionary approval of permit applications which include "takings"
otherwise prohibited by the Act, Browning observed that permits were regularly requested and granted, authorizing conduct "no more intrusive" than photographic identification,
vessel approach, and the broadcast of underwater acoustic
recordings. 99 Apparently, he concluded, the Secretary and the
fishermen subject to this legislation considered such conduct to
be within the Act's broad proscriptions. lOo
Judge Browning also identified an exemption for commercial fishermen, allowing them to register with the Secretary for
permission to intentionally "take" marine mammals in order to
protect their catch, gear, or persons during the course of commercial fishing operations. 101 This exemption, he asserted,
could only exist if such conduct were prohibited by the Act. 102
Browning argued that on its face, this exemption established
that Hayashi's act of firing a rifle to scare away scavenging
dolphins to defend his fishing catch fell within the MMPA's
proscriptions. 103

V. CRITIQUE
The majority erred by narrowly defining ''harassment''
under the MMPA to include only those acts which directly and
seriously disrupt normal marine mammal behavior. 104 The
contention that ''harass'' should be more broadly interpreted is
supported by clear statutory language, the legislative history of
98. [d. at 869.
99. [d. at 868.

100. [d.
101. [d. at 870. Judge Browning noted that some loss of marine mammal
life was inevitable in commercial tuna fishing operations. To protect this
industry, the Congressional exemption provides a "restraining system of
permits and regulations administered by the Secretary" which limits injury
to the animals without destroying commercial fishing enterprises. Hayashi,
22 F.3d at 870.
102. [d.
103. [d.
104. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1994) (Browning,
J., dissenting).
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the MMPA, and the Secretary's regulations enforcing and interpreting the Act.lo5 Furthermore, the majority erroneously
employed the doctrine of noscitur a sociis when defining the
term "harass." Consequently, the majority failed to give effect
to the expressed intent of Congress by not giving "harass" its
independent meaning as Congress intended. lOG
A THE PLAIN MEANING OF "HARASS" SUPPORTS THE
CONTENTION THAT SHOOTING AT PORPOISES CONSTITUTES A
"TAKING" UNDER THE MMPA
The starting point in statutory interpretation is to look at
the plain language of the statute. I07 As the MMPA defines
the term "take" to include the harassment of marine mammals,
it is appropriate to look at the plain meaning of the term "harass" to determine its meaning under the MMPA 108 One way
to determine the plain meaning of a word is to look at the
dictionary.l09 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines
"harass" as "to worry or impede by repeated raids" or "to annoy
persistently."11o
Hayashi's firing two successive rifle shots at porpoises fits
within the common definition of "harass."lll Porpoises, as
highly intelligent mammals, would feel worried or annoyed
when in the close vicinity of rifle shots. 112 Thus, as Congress
included "harassment" as a prohibited form of "taking'Hl3 and
as Hayashi's actions toward the porpoises clearly fall within
105. See infra parts V.A., V.B., and V.C.
106. SINGER, supra note 52, § 46.03, at 94. "The courts owe fidelity to the
will of the legislature. What the legislature says in the text of the statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will.
Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of
the legislature." [d.
107. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484
U.S. 49, 56 (1987) (citing Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980». See Washington Pub. Interest Research Group
v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, 11 F.3d 883, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1993).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994).
109. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities For A Great Oregon,
115 S. Ct. 2407, 2412 (1995).
110. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 517 (1980).
111. See infra text accompanying notes 112-114.
112. See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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the plain meaning of harassment, Hayashi's conduct violated
the MMPA. 114
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MMPA SUPPORTS THE
CONTENTION THAT HAYASHI'S ACTIONS CONSTITUTED A "TAKE"
UNDER THE MMPA
A broad definition of "harass" is supported by the legislative history of the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 115 In the
MMPA, Congress broadly defined "take" as "including harassing, hunting, capturing or killing any marine mammal or attempting to do SO.,,116 The term harass was included to broaden the scope of protections afforded to marine mammals, thereby ensuring the effectiveness of the MMPA. l17 This is evidenced by Congress's statement: "The definition of taking ...
includes the concept of harassment, and it is intended that this
term be construed sufficiently broadly . .. .'>118
Additional examples of "taking" recognized by Congress in
the legislative history also support the contention that the
term "harass" is to be broadly defined. 119 Congress identified
the "intentional pursuit" of a marine mammal, the "use of
acoustic deterrence devices," and the "operation of motor boats"
as examples that would "clearly constitute harassment."12o It
is hard to reconcile how use of an acoustic deterrence device

114. See supra, text accompanying notes 111-113.
115. See infra notes 116-121 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
often uses legislative history to assist in statutory interpretation. See
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities For a Great Oregon, 115 S.
Ct. 2407 (1995); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
116. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1994); H.R. REp. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4155.
117. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 867 (Browning, J., dissenting).
118. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 867 (Browning, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REp.
No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4150)
(emphasis added). Further, arguing that the definition of "take" was too
broad, the Commerce Department proposed an alternative definition that
purposefully omitted the term "harass." Congress however, rejected this
proposal. [d. at 868.
119. [d.
120. H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4155; H.R. REP. No. 970, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6154, 6164.
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"clearly constitutes harassment" yet, firing rifle shots in the
vicinity where porpoises are swimming does not.
Congress' intent that "harass" be "construed sufficiently
broadly" and the examples of actions that constitute harassment establish that Hayashi's act of shooting at the porpoises
clearly falls within Congress' intended definition of "harassment" and thus, is a "taking" under the MMPA. This interpretation of "harass" is consistent with Congress' desire that "porpoises be given every reasonable protection."121
C. REGULATIONS DEFINE "TAKE" BROADLY TO INCLUDE ACTS
THAT DISTURB OR MOLEST MARINE MAMMALS - FIRING AT
PORPOISES SHOULD CONSTITUTE A "TAKE" UNDER THE MMPA
The regulations issued by the National Marine Fisheries
Service that are applicable to the MMPA122 offer additional
support to the contention that Hayashi's violent acts toward
the porpoises violated the MMPA. 123 Although these regulations do not define the term "harass," the regulations do define
"take," at 50 C.F.R. § 216.3, to include "the doing of any other
negligent or intentional act which results in disturbing or
molesting a marine mammal."124
Studies on the cerebral cortex of Cetaceans show that
porpoises are highly intelligent mammals. 125 The functions of
the brain associated with "intelligence" are controlled within
the cerebral cortex. 126 A high degree of convolution of the cerebral cortex connotes a high degree of cerebral functioning.127 Studies reveal that the cerebral cortex of all Cetaceans
121. H.R. REp. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4148.
122. See, e.g., 50 C.F.R. § 216 (1996).
123. See infra notes 124·34 and accompanying text.
124. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1995). See supra note 48.
125. Levin, supra note 2, at 557.
126. [d. The cerebral cortex is responsible for recording the changes in
the external and internal environments, evaluating the environment on
the basis of needs and experiences, and initiating motor activity to reo
spond to the internal and external environments, as well as thinking,
memory, and language. [d.
127. [d. A high degree of convolution of the cerebral cortex increases
the surface area of the cortex. [d.
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is more convoluted than a human's.128 Thus, if cortically mediated behavior is an adequate measure of intelligence, the
similarity between the human cortex and the Cetacean cortex
is indicative of high Cetacean intelligence. 129 Therefore, just
as a human would be "disturbed" or feel "molested" if shot at,
the porpoises swimming in the vicinity of Hayashi's shots
would also feel disturbed and molested. 130 Since he disturbed
the porpoises, Hayashi's actions fell within the regulatory
definition of "take," thereby violating the MMPA.
The regulations in 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 also call into question
the majority's holding that "harassment" must entail a "direct
and significant intrusion . . . upon the normal, life-sustaining
activities of a marine mammaL"131 However, the Code of Federal Regulations § 216.3 states that a detention "no matter
how temporary" constitutes a "taking" under the MMPA. 132
The term "no matter how temporary" does not indicate a "direct and significant intrusion." Further, the majority's assertion that "harassment" must entail an intrusion upon a "lifesustaining activity"133 is in direct conflict with 50 C.F.R. §
216.3, which states that the "collection of a dead animal" constitutes a "taking" under the MMPA. 134 By limiting "harassment" to activities that result in a "direct and significant intrusion upon the normal, life-sustaining activities," the majority
ignored the broad meaning given to "take" by the administrative regulations implementing and interpreting the MMPA.

128. Levin, supra note 2, at 557.
129. [d. at 558.
130. As the cerebral functions include thinking, as well as recording
changes in, evaluating, and adjusting motor activity to respond to the
internal and external environments, see Levin, supra note 2, we may infer
that highly intelligent cetaceans are disturbed by acts of violence directed toward them, such as Hayashi's conduct of shooting a rifle in their
direction.
131. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting).
132. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1996).
133. Hayashi, 22 F.2d at 866.
134. See 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1996).
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D. A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF "HARAss" IS SUPPORTED BY
THE PERMITS ISSUED BY THE SECRETARY UNDER THE MMPA
As noted by Justice Browning in his dissent, the broad
scope of "taking" is evidenced by the permits issued to allow
conduct no more intrusive than Hayashi's shooting in the vicinity of porpoises. ls5 The MMPA prohibits all taking of marine mammals with specified exceptions. ISS Under the
MMPA, the Secretary's authority includes discretionary approval of permit applications, authorizing conduct that constitutes "harassment."137 Exercising this power, the Secretary
issued permits authorizing "vessel approach, helicopter
photogrammetry and photographic identification."138 It is
hard to reconcile how these activities have a "direct and significant" impact upon marine mammals, but firing rifle shots
near porpoises would not.

E. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN EMPLOYING THE DOCTRINE
OF NOSCITUR A SOCIIS TO DETERMINE THE MEANING OF
"HARAss" UNDER THE MMPA
By applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis,139 the Ninth
Circuit narrowly interpreted the term "harass" under the
MMPA. I40 The Ninth Circuit erred by employing this doctrine
for two reasons. First, the doctrine is employed only when the
legislative intent or meaning of the statute is unclear. 141
However, the legislative intent of including "harassment" as a
form of "take" is not unclear or ambiguous. 142 Congress stat135. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting).
136. ld.
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(3)(A) (1994). Section 1371(a)(3)(A) states in relevant
part: "The Secretary, on the basis of the best scientific evidence available
and in consultation with the Marine Mammal Commission, is authorized and
directed . "
to determine when... to waive the requirements of this
section so as to allow taking ... and ... issue permits." ld.
138. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 41458 (1993».
139. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis states that if a meaning of a statute is unclear, "the meaning of doubtful words may be determined by reference to their relationship with other associated words and phrases."
SINGER, supra note 52, § 47.16, at 183.
140. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting).
141. SINGER, supra note 52, § 47.16, at 183.
142. See supra section V.B.
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ed that "harassment" is to be "construed sufficiently broadly"
so that "porpoises [are] given every reasonable protection."I43
Second, noscitur a sociis may only be used when the clear
meaning of the word is doubtfuL 144 As the plain meaning of
"harass" may be found in the dictionary, its meaning is not
doubtfuL 145
Thus, as Congress' intent is unambiguous and the meaning of "harass" is not doubtful, the majority incorrectly applied
the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to determine the meaning of
"harass" within the MMPA. I46
The Ninth Circuit's error in employing the doctrine of
noscitur a sociis is further evidenced by a recent Supreme
Court decision. 147 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon 148 involved a dispute over whether
logging activities that would kill or injure an endangered species amounted to "harm" to the species resulting in a "taking"
under the Endangered Species Act (hereinafter "ESA").149 The
Supreme Court declined to invalidate the Secretary of the
Interior's regulation, finding that the Secretary has reasonably
construed the term "harm" under the ESA. 150
In considering the lower court's decision, the Supreme

143. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REp.
No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4150);
H.R. REP. No. 707, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4144, 4148.
144. SINGER, supra, § 47.16, at 183.
145. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
146. Rules of construction are employed to "'illuminate the intent of
the drafters; when the rule conflicts with other, clearer indications of
intent, its results should be ignored.'" Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 n.3 (Browning, J., dissenting) (quoting Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354,
359 (9th Cir. 1990».
147. Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for Great Oregon,
115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995).
148. 115 S.Ct. 2407 (1995).
149. Kenneth J. Plante et aI., Babbit v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities
for a Great Oregon: Preserving the "Critical Link" Between Habitat Modification
and the "Taking" of an Endangered Species, 20 NOVA L. REV. 747, 776 (1996).
The ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such
conduct." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
150. Babbit, 115 S. Ct. at 2412.
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Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in applying the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. 151 The Supreme Court found that by
employing this doctrine the Ninth Circuit had denied the word
"harm" its independent meaning. 152 The Court explained
that, due to its statutory context, Congress meant the term
"harm" to serve a specific purpose by including it in the
ESA. 153 The Court held that "harm" is distinct from the other
words used to define "take" and the Ninth Circuit erred by
employing noscitur a sociis because it essentially gave "harm"
the same meaning as the other words in the definition. 154
Just as the Supreme Court in Babbitt held that the doctrine of noscitur a sociis was incorrectly applied to determine
the meaning of "harm" under the ESA,155 the Ninth Circuit
erred in applying the doctrine to determine the meaning of
"harass" under the MMPA. 156 In employing such a doctrine,
the majority looked to the other words that constitute a "take"
under the MMPA, such as "hunt," "capture," or "kill," without
giving "harass" its own independent meaning. 157 The statutory context of "harass," as set forth in the MMPA, suggests that
Congress meant the term to serve a specific function in the
MMPA. 158 Using the Babbitt analysis, the legislative intent
must be given meaning. 159 Therefore, the majority incorrectly
applied the doctrine of noscitur a sociis to determine the meaning of "harass" and failed to acknowledge the legislative intent
behind the MMPA.

151. [d. at 2415.
152. [d.
153. [d.
154. [d.
155. [d.
156. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 (Browning, J., dissenting).
157. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864. The majority declares that because "harass"
is a "very general term" it is necessary to look to its context to ascertain
its meaning. [d. The majority then states that since '"words grouped in a
list should be given related meaning,' we look to the other statutory and
regulatory examples of 'taking'." [d., (quoting Third Nat'l Bank v. Impac
Ltd., 432 U.S. 312, 322 (1977)). In deciding that "hunt," "capture," and "kill"
are words that have a certain level of intrusiveness on marine mammals,
"[harassment] must entail a silnilar level of direct intrusion." [d.
158. See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the legislative intent in including the term "harass" in the MMPA.
159. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 n.3 (Browning, J., dissenting).
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F. THE PROPOSED GUIDELINES TO THE MMPA'S 1994
AMENDMENTS ESTABLISH THAT CONGRESS INTENDED TO
PROHIBIT THE TYPE OF CONDUCT PERFORMED BY HAYASHI
In 1994, Congress amended certain prOVlSIOns of the
MMPA. 160 Specifically, Congress added an amendment to prohibit certain deterrent techniques used by fishermen that have
a significant adverse impact on marine mammals. 161 Ai:, part
of the 1994 Amendments, Congress directed the NMFS to
develop and publish a list of guidelines on how fishermen could
safely deter marine mammals. 162 The proposed guidelines
prohibit the use of firearms and other devices that propel injurious projectiles for deterrent purposes, as their use has a
significant adverse effect on the targeted marine mammals. 163
Before these proposed guidelines are adopted, they must first
be submitted to individuals who have experience and knowledge of interactions with marine mammals and the use of
However, if approved, the act of
deterrence devices. 1M
shooting a firearm where porpoises are swimming as a deterrent method would violate the MMPA. 165 These amendments

160. The Supreme Court has stated that when Congress acts to amend a
statute, it presumes Congress "intends its amendment to have substantial
effect." Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2414 (1995) (quoting Stone v. INS, 115 S. Ct. 1537, 1545
(1995».
161. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(4) (1994).
162. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (a)(4)(B) (1994); Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Deterrence Regulations and Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 22345 (1995).
163. Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Deterrence Regulations
and Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 22345, 22346 (1995).
164. [d.
Section 101(a)(4) requires that NMFS consults with appropriate
experts on the implementation of the deterrence provisions.
NMFS has
compiled a list of individuals believed to have experience and knowledge
of marine mammals and the use of deterrence devices.
These individuals
have been sent a. copy of this proposed rule and asked by NMFS to submit
commits on this proposed rule. [d.
165. [d. In discussing the prohibition of firearms for deterrent purposes,
the NMFS referred to incidents where fishermen used firearms against
marine mammals. [d. For example, the Alaska Prince William Sound fishery
used firearms to deter killer whales from damaging its catch and gear.
Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fisheries, 59 Fed. Reg.
45263, 45264 (1994). Three killer whales from the relevant pod were lost
during 1985, three in 1986, one in 1987 and one in 1988. [d. Furthermore,
several whales in the pod showed evidence of bullet wounds. [d. The
deaths of the animals were believed to be the result of intentional takes
by participants in the fishery. [d.
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give further support to the contention that Congress intended
"harass" to be broadly interpreted to encompass violent acts
such as Hayashi's.
VI. CONCLUSION
By narrowly defining what constitutes "harm" under the
MMPA, the Ninth Circuit ignored the plain meaning of the
term, the legislative history of the MMPA and the regulations
interpreting the MMPA. l66 The Ninth Circuit's holding in
Hayashi allows fishermen to harass marine mammals as long
as the action does not seriously disrupt normal marine mammal behavior. Based on this holding, fishermen can intentionally shoot at mammals to save their catch without any liability
under the MMPA. One must question whether this is the
"protection from human activities" that Congress envisioned
when it enacted the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
April Fisher"
Amber A. Belt"

Additionally, in assessing the frequency of "takes" of marine mammals by fisheries, the Department of Commerce reported that, based on
congressional guidance, the chasing away of killer whales by fishermen to
deter the mammals from catch and gear constitutes harassment under the
MMPA. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Fishing Operations, 59
Fed. Reg. 43818, 43819 (1994).
166. See supra part V.
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